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Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 16)Those charged with the pursuit of national
economic policy are set manifold tasks. They
must define the nation's stated and unstated
economic objectives and fill in details. Watch-
ing theflowof events, they must judge the
state of the economy and estimate the direc-
tion in which the economy is moving. They
must infer what factors are influencing its
course. They must decide what can be done
and—with due attention to the nation's non-
economic objectives—what ought to be' done
to reinforce the favorable and restrain the
unfavorable factors. And they must act, which
often requires 'persuading others to act also
and should always include preparations to
meet contingencies.
The tasks are not easy. Although progress
has been made in reporting on current events,
P A RT I even now their course is revealed only by bits
and pieces of information. These vary in scope
and precision, and float into view sometimes
soon, sometimes long after the event. Al-
though knowledge of the process of economic
change is wider than before, it is still far from
Towards adequate.We are not always sure which de-
velopments and which factors are favorable
and which unfavorable, which important and aFirmer whichtrivial,which persistent and which
temporary. The means at hand to influence the
Basisof courseof events are greatly superior to those
available to earlier generations, yet they are
still incomplete, difficult to coordinate, and of
Economic uncertainpower. And as always, sectional
interests differ and opinions about the way to
Policy reachnational objectives also differ, and these
must be reconciled or overruled.
Nor are the problems of policy for eco-
nomic progress easier, or the importance of
policy less, because the United States has over
the years made real economic gains in every
major direction. The nation's goals are not
static; they advance. There is no release from
responsibility; the nation's responsibilities be-
come wider.
During the past year, economic develop-
Nom: This report was presented at the annual
meeting of the Board of Directors of the National
Bureau held in New York City, February 27, 1961.
I am indebted to Arthur F. Burns, Geoffrey H.
Moore, and Hal B. Lary for helpful suggestions.ments reminded us of the persistent economic
problems that confront the American people—
problems of stability, of growth, and of in-
ternational balance. Also, the discussions of
the year, such as they were, made plain how
far from sufficient are information and under-
standing of the problems, and how widely
different are opinions on how best to get the
economic progress we all want.
To make firmer the basis of economic
policy continues to be a job worth doing.
The purpose of the National Bureau is to
assist in this high endeavor. By developing
and improving economic information, we aim
to expand and improve economic intelligence.
By analyzing the process and the causes and
effects of economic change, we try to deepen
understanding of the significance of events
and improve judgment of the factors involved.
In critically examining new and old proposals,
we seek to improve the implements of policy,
and also to clarify and show the way to
reconciling differing sectional interests and
diverse national objectives.
This work we try to do with care and with
objectivity. For we wish our findings to com-
mand the public acceptance that is essential if
they are to be put to use in strengthening the
basis of economic policy.
It is the use to which we hope will be put
the twenty studies published since the begin-
ning of 1960; the nine studies in or on the way
to press; the six manuscripts now or soon to
be in the hands of the Board for review; the
various studies under way at the beginning of
the year, with which the staff and our many
friends and collaborators arestillbusying
themselves at this time; and the new studies
we are starting or planning for the months
ahead.
If, as in the past, we tackle questions of
fundamental importance and carry on our
work in conformity with our principles, it is
a reasonable hope. We may expect that, in
more than one way and on more than one
occasion, practical use in improving and carry-
ing out policy will be made of tested informa-
tion on the subjects with which we concern
ourselves.
It is the National Bureau's custom each year
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to make a full accounting of its work and a
declaration of its plans, and we must therefore
be more specific. In Parts II and III of this
Annual Report are listed and described the
work we have completed, the work in process,
and our plans for the ftiture. Here I shall
point to some of the items and suggest how
our work may find its uses—in some cases,
perhaps, many uses—indealing more ef-
fectively with the persistent economic prob-
lems of the American people.
Consider, to begin with, the study of the
pricestatisticsof the federal government
recently completed by the Price Statistics Re-
view Committee of the National Bureau. The
review was made at the request of the Bureau
of the Budget. We undertook it because we
had a deep interest in the range of problems
involved, running back to 1927, when Mills'
notable study of the behavior of prices was
published, and because we could enlist the
services of the group of highly competent
economists and statisticians headed by Stigler.
After the usual review of the committee's
report by the National Bureau's Board of
Directors, it was transmitted to the Director of
the Budget late last year, along with a dozen
substantial papers on particular points pre-
pared at the request of the Stigler Committee.
The report was presented a few weeks ago to
the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of
the Joint Economic Committee by Dr. Bow-
man, Assistant Director for Statistical Stand-
ards, Bureau of the Budget.1 Hearings on the
report and its recommendations are to be held
by the Subcommittee this spring.
The price statistics study is a comprehensive
review and analysis of the existing price data
and price indexes, with an eye to ways to im-
prove them and ways to discover means of
improving them. Attention is paid to a variety
of important technical problems—the sources
of price data, which may come from buyers
as well as from sellers; specifications of the
goods priced, which may be tight, as in the
case of the Consumer Price Index, or loose,
as in the case of the Index of Prices Paid by
1U.S.Congress,JointEconomic Committee,
Government Price Statistics, Hearings.. .January24,
1961.Farmers; sampling procedures, which affect
the efficiency with which prices are collected
and the ease with which the precision of
indexes is determined; weights, which may be
left untouched for long periods or revised
frequently and regularly; and still others.
These technical problems are not merely
matters of concern to the technicians. How
they are dealt with affects information on
which public issues are judged and settled.
That this is so may be sufficiently evident
from the Bureau of the Budget's request for
a review of the price statistics. But let us listen
to Dr. Bowman's presentation to the Con-
gress: "The price statistics of the Federal
Government make up an important segment
of the factual data which constitute our
economic and social intelligence. They are
widely used not only by the Federal Govern-
ment, but by all segments of our economy,
business, labor, State and local governments,
and research organizations." Further, "The
importance of these data for economic analysis
has gained special recognition in recent years
due to the general interest in evaluating the
effects and forces of inflationary trends in our
economy. Hearings of the Joint Economic
Committee on the Relationship of Prices to
Economic Stability and Growth for the 85th
Congress and on Employment, Growth, and
Price Levels for the 86th Congress focused
attention on the need for reliable price sta-
tistics for the analysis of current economic
problems of the highest importance."
Dr. Bowman added that "The Bureau of
the Budget is aware that notable improve-
ments and modernizing changes have been
made in the price statistics of the Government
during thepastdecade.Nevertheless we
believed, in view of the importance of the
problems involved, that the time had come
for a complete reexamination and reevaluation
of the price statistics program of the Federal
Government with a view to the development
of recommendations foritscontinued im-
provement."
Dr. Bowman then stated: "The Bureau of
the Budget believes this report from the
tional Bureau of Economic Research provides
the expert guidance sought. Its recommenda-
tions deserve and will receive very careful
consideration."
I can be more specific about the significance
of the matters treated by the Price Committee.
Notice, for example, the stress placed on
changes in the quality of commodities and
services. If, as the Price Committee feels,
provements in quality have on the whole been
large, and these are inadequately reflected in
the price statistics, then the trend of prices
is seriously misjudged. An experiment in ad-
justing prices for quality change is described
in the staff paper by Griliches, who draws on
his work here on agricultural input, output,
and productivity. His results may startle those
who think of price indexes as exact instru-
ments of public policy. The approach has
possibilities, but it is clear from Griliches' brief
discussion in Part III, below, that correction
of price indexes for quality change is a dif-
ficult problem. Whether the degree of over-
statement of price rise is greater now than
formerly is even more difficult to determine.
The possibility is usually glossed over, but the
problem of quality changes may be ignored
less easily after the emphasis placed on it by
the Price Committee. And the same is true of
a related question discussed in the price re-
port,namely,the speed and manner of
adjustment in the price indexes for the rise of
new products and the obsolescence of old. The
policy issues involved concern not only the
degree of inflation but also, for example,
whether the United States is "pricing itself out
of world markets."
Equally relevant to the question of inflation,
and to other policy questions as well, is an
analysis included in the staff paper by McAllis-
ter. He shows to what extent the measured
rigidity of prices and of price indexes depends
on the scope of the data, the number of firms
reporting, and the source of the information.
For instance, the broadened coverage by the
Wholesale Price Index of highly fabricated
products, the prices of which usually fluctuate
less than the prices of raw and partially
fabricated materials, has tended to make the
price index more rigid. McAllister estimates
the magnitude of this bias and suggests that
3it may be quantitatively too important to be
neglected when it is asked how strongly prices
resist downward pressures.Similarly, Mc-
Allister'sresultson therelation between
frequency of price change and number of price
reporters raises some doubts about the validity
of analyses concerning the relation between
price rigidity and competition, and doubts
also about the validity of policy conclusions
drawn from these analyses.
Still other contemporary policy issues are
touched by the price study, of which one
example must suffice. As I have already men-
tioned, the Consumer Price Index is based on
specification pricing, and the Index of Prices
Paid by Farmers on wilt-value pricing—that
is, the prices asked for are those of unspecified
qualities bought in the greatest volume by
farmers.Thecontrastbetweenthetwo
methods is put very sharply by the difference
between their respective reports on the change
in automobile prices that took place during
1960. In the CPI, the automobile price com-
ponent went down by 2 per cent. In the farm
index, automobile prices fell by 11 per cent,
simply because farmers shifted, or were pre-
sumed to have shifted, a substantial part of
their purchases from the standard cars to the
new and lower-priced compact models. The
implications for parity prices and thereby for
the distribution of income between farm and
urban groups of the population are obvious.
My next illustration is prompted by a paper,
now in its final stages of preparation, reporting
on the latest in a long series of studies and
experiments in the analysis of current business
conditions. The object is to determine the
sequence of events during cyclical fluctuations
in business and thus to learn to judge the
course of business and estimate the prospects
ofa, turn—or confirmitsappearance—as
quickly and accurately as possible.
Which contracycical steps to take (during
expansionwell as contraction), when to
take them, and with what vigor—the answers
to these troublesome questions hinge on the
speed and confidence with which such judg-
ments and estimates can be made. For a
quarter ofcentury, therefore, the National
Bureau has been devoting a sizable fraction
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of its attention and resources to the problem.
We have been gathering and developing
relevant facts, constructing and trying out
various methods of analysis, applying these
methods to the facts in a number of ways, and
subjecting the results to the critical tests of
reason and experience.
Much of what has been learned is now
gathered together in the two-volume Business
Cycle Indicators, edited by Moore, which is
included among this year's publications of the
National Bureau. The study contains an un-
usually broad collection of contributions to the
analysis of current business conditions. In-
cluded are some published before and now out
of print, and others made available for the
first time. These discuss at length a number of
highly relevant subjects: how indicators of
recession and revival may be selected; which
indicators we have chosen for inclusion in our
lists; why particular indicators behave the way
they do in relation to general business; how
changes in them should be interpreted; what
their value has been in foreshadowing or con-
firming turns in business at large and in esti-
mating the probable severity of a contraction
or strength of an expansion already under
way; and what qualifications need to be kept
in mind when using theindicators. The
volumes also include aids to the current use of
the indicators and, for the benefit of business
analysts and others, give over a hundred
significant economic series in their original
and seasonally adjusted form, together with
sources and descriptions. During the year, we
issued a brochure informing the public of the
National Bureau's research on indicators of
cyclical revivals and recessions and providing
a brief preview of some of the contents of the
two-volume work now off the press. The
brochure has proved to be something of a
"best seller."
We were not surprised by the eagerness of
business analysts to put our latest results to
work. Of course, our results have always been
released as soon as we had sufficient con-
fidence in them, and they have been in use for
a long time. Indeed, practical use of the work
began with the preparation' in 1937 and publi-
cation in 1938 of the first report on indicators,made by Mitchell and Burns at the request of
the Secretary of the Treasury. It is reproduced
in Moore's collection.
Following closely on the heels of the Moore
volumes is the paper in preparation, Shiskin's
"Reporting Current Business Cycle Develop-
ments." It describes a most interesting current
application of the work, which we regard also
as another opportunity to learn something.
The study had its immediate origin in a
request in 1957, made of the Bureau of the
Census by the Council of Economic Advisers,
"to undertake to develop methods of apprais-
ing current business fluctuations in a monthly
report that would take advantage of the avail-
ability of a great many economic time series,
new findings about the relations of economic
processes over time, and large-scale electronic
computers." This particular experiment has
therefore been under way now for over three
years. The period spans the 1957-58 contrac-
tion, the 195 8-60 expansion, and the first
months of the contraction that began in 1960.
The CEA-Census experiment was carried on
with the close cooperation of the National
Bureau, and Shiskin's paper describing it was,
in fact, prepared as part of the current Na-
tional Bureau study of the uses of electronic
computers in business cycle research. The
paper will soon be submitted to the Board and,
if approved, published promptly.
Readers of the paper will find,after a
discussion of the need for "an early-warning
system" of economic intelligence of recession
and recovery, the basis of such a system in the
accumulated findings of business cycle re-
search and the recent development of elec-
tronic computers and programs. There follows
a description of the report on current business
cycle developments that the Bureau of the
Census has been making monthly to the
Council of Economic Advisers, and a record
of "performance" during thethreeyears
covered. In the final section, note is made of
the hazards of current interpretation, and ways
to improve the report are suggested.
The hazards are indeed great, but even a
speedy recognition of a cyclical turn that has
already taken place is valuable. To illustrate,
as late as December of last year many people
were still questioning whether the country was
experiencing a recession. Anyone following
Moore's indicators, as Shiskin did, would have
seen the following: When the steelstrike
ended in November 1959, only a quarter of
the leading series—those series usually leading
turns in general business, such as orders for
machinery—had regained their previous highs,
and none did so after December. In February
1960, when the aftermath of the strike had
been largely dissipated, half of the coincident
series—suchasindustrial production—were
currently at the highest levels reached during
the expansion. By the end of June, this was
true only of a fifth of the coincident series. By
October, almost all the coincident series were
below their peaks, and half the lagging series
—such as inventories—also were down. The
October data made it clear, also, that the lead-
ing and the coincident series were generally
still falling. This information was available
before the end of November.
As tests at the National Bureau and else-
where indicate, the difficulties in judging the
course of business from the information pro-
vided by the indicators are especially great
when events like Korea and major strikes
intervene. In any case, however, no procedure
can be perfect; none can eliminate the area of
uncertainty that inevitably surrounds the cur-
rent analysis and forecasting that each of us
must do.
Yet the more reason and experience are
brought. to bear on the problem, the greater
arc the chances of success in interpreting the
current flow of events. This is the justification
of our continuing work on the cyclical be-
havior of various significant economic pro-
cesses. Can there be serious doubt of the value
for stabilization policy of systematic knowl-
edge on fluctuations in federal receipts, ex-
penditures, and budget balances, or in labor
productivity and labor cost, or in exports—
subjects of studies in this year's list of publica-
tions? Or of analyses of postwar cycles in
inventories; or of cycles in prices, costs, and
profit margins; or of the history of money—
sub jects of studies soon to go to the Board
for approval? Or of studies of money demand
and money supply, of consumer plans and
5business anticipations, and of cycles in the
labor market,inmaterials purchasing,in
orders and production, and in credit quality—
subjects of investigations not quite so far
along, and therefore counted in our inventory
of work in process?
Preliminary results from some of these
studies have already been of assistance in
developing and improving the indicators of
recession and revival. The other studies, too,
may help to reduce still further the uncertainty
that surrounds efforts to probe the future.
However, practical interest in the studies ex-
tends beyond their possible use in the difficult
business of forecasting. We may hope that they
will also help to improve understanding of the
connections among events, and thus of the
factors operating in the economy.
To illustrate the kinds of ideas with which
the staff is wrestling I shall draw on some of
these studies in process. Until more of the
evidence isin, and we are surer of their
validity and significance, these ideas must be
viewed only asinteresting hypotheses on
which work is needed and is proceeding.
In the paper on cycles in labor cost that
we published during the year, Hultgren de-
monstrated how the general state of business
influences the level and direction of movement
of unit labor costs. In the paper on which he
is now working, he has pushed his analysis
another step forward, to deal with cyclical
fluctuations in total costs, in selling prices, and
in profit margins. In his and related results
may be seen the outlines of a significant
sequence, during the round of business con-
traction and expansion, whichaffectthe
crucial decisions to invest.
More specifically, the relation between unit
costs and prices is altered during business con-
traction in such a way as to cause profit
margins to turn up early. Usually the rate of
rise in the margins is sufficient, compared with
the rate of fall in the volume of sales, to cause
aggregate profits to begin to move up. These
developments act powerfully to improve profit
prospects. Investment decisions are influenced
by other factors as well, including the costs of
equipment and plant facilities and the costs of
finance. But it is usual for these costs also to
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become more favorable during contraction. In
combination with improved profit prospects—
and the flow of cash into corporate treasuries,
as Payne's recently published paper demon-
strates—they serve to stimulate a revival in
orders for equipment and Construction con-
tracts, although sales, production, and em-
ployment are usuallystillfalling. That is,
commitments to invest in plant and equipment
—some of which may have been postponed to
await more favorable conditions—are made
more readily and on a larger scale. In turn,
the revival in commitments to spend money on
investment goods helps to bring the business
contraction to a close.
Something like this sequence of events dur-
ing contraction and revival seems also to
characterize expansion and recession. As we
know from the work of Mitchell and his
collaborators, investment commitments do in
fact usually lead turns in business: statistics
on them constitute several of Moore's leading
series. Thus, if the new results stand up to
closer inspection, they will fill a significant
page in the account of business cycles and
their causes to which our work is designed to
contribute. They may also provide the back-
ground required to judge when particular
determinants of costs, profits, and investment
take on an autonomous role—a matter of vital
concern in stabilization policy.
From Friedman's work with the demand for
money, on which several preliminary reports
have appeared and which has grown to the
two substantial volumes in preparation, I shall
pick two points for mention. One bears es-
pecially on events since 1959; the other, on
a trend over the whole postwar period.
The first point relates to Friedman's studies
of the relations between business conditions
and the rate of change of money supply. It
matters somewhat how money supply is de-
fined—whether inclusive of time deposits in
commercial banks as well as demand deposits
and currency in circulation, as is done by
Friedman; or only of demand deposits and
currency, as is more conventional. Also, the
rate-of-change series (corresponding to either
concept of money supply) is highly irregular,
and its direction and turns therefore not easyto determine precisely. Indeed, thereisa
question whether its peaks and troughs can
be determined with sufficient precision to
warrant reasonably specific dating, except oc-
casionally. Nevertheless, as economists are
once again learning, the behavior of the money
supply may hardly be neglected by those in-
terested in stabilization policy. For this reason
Shiskin includes a rate-of-change series in the
section of his monthly report which contains
irregular but significant series, and the Federal
Reserve Bulletin and other publications show
a money-supply series.
A reading of these series reveals that during
1958-60 the rate of increase in money supply
reached its peak within six months after the
business cycle trough in April 1958, and then
fell so rapidly—in this case, the direction of
movement is quite clear—that in little more
than a year money supply was declining
absolutely. The absolutedeclinepersisted
throughout the year from about mid-1959 to
mid-1960.
Three important questions are raised when
this behavior is viewed against the background
of other events of the period and of the ideas
and facts that are being explored by Friedman.
One question relates to the causes of this
behavior of money supply, another to its
consequences, and a third to a difficulty it may
suggest for policy. First, then, the decline in
money supply was unusual for a period of
business expansion, as Friedman's extensive
collection of data indicates. To what extent
was the decline a reflection of policy to com-
bat domestic inflation, coupled with an effort
to reduce the deficit in the balance of pay-
ments, and to what extent a result of other
causes—for example, difficulties raised by the
steel strike in judging the course of business
developments? Second, the peak in the rate of
increase in money supply was followed by the
recession of 1960. Was this another case
fitting Friedman's tentative generalization that
the peak in the rate of increase in money
supply has invariably preceded the business
cycle peak; or, apart from the generalization,
was the sequence in 1958-60 a case of cause
and effect or merely a coincidence? And what
consequences might be expected to flow from
the extraordinary rise in the rate of change in
money supply that came so early in the busi-
ness contraction of 1960? Third, and by way
of corollary to the preceding, were develop-
ments during 195 8-60 in money supply and
in business conditions illustrative of a dilemma
that is posed by competing objectives—in this
instance, of growth and low unemployment on
the one hand and reasonably stable price levels
on the other? These are serious and highly
controversial questions that need to be most
carefully and objectively weighed. We may
hope that Friedman's and other of our studies
will bring to the controversy some of the
scientific evidence that is so badly needed.
The other point, discussed in Friedman's
progress report in Part III, refers to the post-
war rise in the income velocity of money, that
is,in the ratio of net national product to
money supply. The rise runs counter to the
long-term trend over the preceding three-
quarters of a century, and therefore poses an
interesting puzzle. Friedman proposes to ex-
plain the interruption by the hypothesis of
growing confidence on the part of the public
in the stability of the economy. As be men-
tions, there may be additional factors involved,
and Selden is pursuing some of them on
another tack.
Friedman istesting his hypothesis in a
variety of ways. If he finds it possible to
formulate the hypothesis in a way consistent
with the available facts—his luck has been
mixed, so far—it willstill be necessary to
consider the hypothesis as tentative, at least
until it is found to fit significant facts that lie
outside the range of data used in formulating
it.If he should confirm the hypothesis, he
will have made significant progress towards
improving knowledge of the factors that deter-
mine expectations, and also towards develop-
ing an objective measure of expectations.
Expectations are surely a major key to eco-
nomic behavior, and not only with respect to
the demand for money. As Bums demon-
strated some years ago in his paper on the
"InstabilityofConsumer Spending"and
Friedman developed in his own way in A
Theory of the Consumption Function, expec-
tations greatly influence the decisions of con-
7sumers on how to divide their income between
consumption and saving. And business cycle
studies lead us to believe—I referred to the
point earlier—that expectations enter also into
the explanation of the behavior of investors.
Also important, if he is successful, Friedman
will have added to the objective evidence that
is accumulating of a most significant shift in
the climate of public opinion—a shift towards
more confidence in business stability—that has
greatimplicationsforthefutureofthe
economy as well as for stabilization policy.
The decline in money supply that began in
the middle of 1959 was of course not the only
outstanding "special" development of recent
years. There has been much talk of the sharp
rise in the outflow of gold and in the rate
of acquisition by foreigners of liquid dollar
assets, which I have mentioned, and the steel
strike is still remembered. Attention has been
called also to the unusually rapid shift in the
federal balance of cash receipts and ex-
penditures, from a substantial deficit position
around the beginning of 1959 to a surplus
position a year later. Whether, or to what
extent, some of these other developments
played a role—direct or indirect—in cutting off
the expansion last spring is, like the question
about the money supply, a scientific problem
that will interest economists long after public
discussion of the events has died down. While
it is not always known how or to what extent
particular special factors influence the course
of the cycle, it is clear that special factors do
play a part in every cycle, serving in some part
to prolong or shorten, accelerate or retard,
expansions andcontractions.
It is becoming clear, also, that short-lived
episodic factors have not, in the past, wholly
accounted for differences among cycles. Evi-
dence has been accumulating that secular and
structural changes play a significant part.
Friedman's study of money deals with one
aspect of the question. Broader is the study by
Burns and Moore of the postwar cycle. They
are analyzing the characteristics of cycles
since World War II and considering how they
differ from prewar cycles. Their object is to
determine with what degree of confidence, and
on what assumptions, we may expect that the
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economy wifi continue to be free of serious
economic depressions—a matter of the greatest
interest to everybody.
Abramovitz ispursuing the problem of
differences among cycles in another way. He
is analyzing the so-called long swings that
appear to have characterized the rate of
American economic growth in the past. His
study will interest persons concerned with
economic policy even though he limits himself
to the scientific questions involved. For those
involved in policy must keep in mind the
possibility of long-term cumulative tendencies
towards severe contractions—or, asit may
appear in the economy of today, the possibility
of cumulative tendencies towards reductions in
the rate of economic growth.
Because long waves seem to run between
fifteen and twenty-five years in length, adequate
statistical data covering a period long enough
to include more than five or six observations
are difficult to obtain. Another great difficulty
arises because the nature of the economy can
hardly have remained unchanged over a period
long enough to include even as few as two or
three long waves, as Abramovitz takes pains to
acknowledge. His results will therefore not be
as free of speculation as he would wish, even
if he should be able to add to his observations
by examining the records of other countries.
In any case, the study is not yet at an end, and
in a paper recently completed Abramovitz
puts the current position of knowledge of the
long swings in a tentative way. He feels that
at the present time he may be justified in
contending no more than this: the long swings
that have been observed in the economic ac-
tivity of the United States during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries have been
"quasi-sell-generating, in the limited, but im-
portant, senses that (1) they have involved
certain forces which operated cumulatively for
a time to strengthen a surge of development
following a protracted period of relatively high
unemployment and so to prevent the early
recurrence of another such period; (2) they
have generated checks and obstacles which,
after a time, generally longer than a single
business cycle, rendered the economy morevulnerable to another period of depression or
stagnation."
Abramovitz emphasizes that "to say this
much is, of course, not to say that episodic
factors were not important, nor is it to say
that the cumulative and self-reversing tenden-
cies, such as they are, have remained generally
constant."Indeed,hegivesexamplesof
episodic factors that were clearly important
in determining the course of the successive
surges of development: financial panics, ac-
cumulation of demands deferred during wars
or depressions, monetary policy, gold dis-
coveries, and other factorsthat have in-
fluenced the supply of money, and economic
abroad.
He notes also how the postulated systematic
mechanism must have been altered during the
period in which the swings can be observed
because of change in the relative importance
of different fields of investment, the decline
in immigration, the new role of government,
and still other factors.
With these qualifications, Abramovitz' hy-
pothesis is not necessarily inconsistent with
Friedman's, which emphasizes the "episodic
factors" that influence money supply; or with
Burns' and Moore's, which lays stress on the
broadened roleof government and other
structural and secular changes in economic
life. Work remains to be done to sharpen
Abramovitz' hypothesis and see how well it
helps to explain the past, and also to consider
to what extent it might have application to the
He feels that it may not be entirely
irrelevant: "These changes and many others
will, no doubt, have altered the relations be-
tween economic development and intensity of
resource use. ...However,this problem. .. is
the same problem as that of maintaining bal-
ance between capacity and effective demand.
Historical and analytical studies of these
swings... should,therefore, enrich and test
the models designed to help us understand the
problem of maintaining balance in growth as
this old problem is faced both by advanced
and backward countries in a modem setting."
An example of a force tending to check
the extension of a period of mild cycles, of
the kind Abramovitz has in mind, may be the
deteriorationof creditqualitythat seems
to develop during a prolonged period of
moderate fluctuation. Some of the facts that
Earley and his collaborators are unearthing in
their study of recent changes in the quality of
credit, on which a report is given in Part III,
may appear disquieting in the light of earlier
work on the question at the National Bureau
as well as of the hypothesis of long waves.
However, there are subtle problems in in-
terpreting information on credit quality, as
Earley is well aware, and for this and other
reasons it is too soon to say just how his data
fit in with the theory of long waves. This
question, also, invites further careful study.
To the discussions of economic instability
and of the factors causing it, discussions that
are going on and will go on in the future,
interesting ideas will be brought by Abramo-
vitz' work. We may hope—in research no one
can be sure—that the study will at least help
clarify the nature of the problem and suggest
ways to learn more of the forces at work.
His study is also, of course, a section of the
work we are doing on the great problem of
economic growth, a problem to which I now
turn.
There is little doubt in the minds of many
people that in comparison with the growth
of some other countries, especially in the
postwar period, or in relation to expanding
wants here and abroad, the rate of economic
growth of the United States has not been
satisfactory. But opinions differ on this, as on
other matters. Since the issue is, and always
has been, of paramount importance,itis
highly desirable to develop and set forth the
facts on the rate of economic growth as clearly
and accuratelyaspossible. Some of the
Bureau's attention has been given to the
question, particularly of the growth of this
country. Indeed, the Bureau's first study dealt
with the rise of national income in the United
States during the decade 1909-19. And now
in press is Kuznets' Capital in the American
Economy, which contains a large body of
carefully assembled information on the na-
tion's growth over most of the past century.
His new book is a capstone not only to the
capital formation and financing project, of
9which it is the concluding volume, but also to
much of the work he and his associates have
been doing at the National Bureau for thirty
years.
Work on such important and difficult ques-
tions as the rate of economic growth is never
finished, however. As more is learned about
the technical problems involved, as new and
improved information is developed—partly in
response to better knowledge of what is
needed—and as the character and content of
economic life change so that formerly minor
deficiencies of the indexes stop being negligi-
ble,it becomes necessary and desirable to
improve and extend the measurements of
economic growth. There is a further factor.
When men look for signs of retardation or
acceleration of growth, or make close com-
parisons with other countries, they are dealing
with problems that demand more precise data.
If we are to avoid being misled by the avail-
able figures, therefore, more work is needed
here too.
I have already referred to the difficulty that
quality change poses for the measurement of
price increase. The difficulty applies equally to
the measurement of the nation's economic
growth. If improvements in quality have in-
deed been large on net balance, then the rate
of economic growth issignificantly under-
stated. For rates of increase in real national
product and in real national wealth, in real
wages and in productivity, are obtained by
deflating money values by indexes of prices.
Also relevant, to take another example, is
the treatment of consumer durable goods. The
value of these goods is included in current
measures of national product when they are
purchased, but the services rendered by them
are not included at all, nor is the "do-it-your-
self" work that is often involved in putting
them to use. According to Goldsmith's study
of national wealth, another item in this year's
list of finished work, the net value of consumer
durable goods held by the American people
(expressed in 1947-49 prices) rose from 7.3
per cent of the nation's real wealth in 1945
to 12.8 per cent in 1958. Correspondingly,
we may presume, the services rendered by
these forms of capital also went up, and so
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too did the amount of home labor devoted to
utilizing them. If national production inclusive
of these has been growing more rapidly in
relation to measured production in the United
States than in other countries, and in recent
than in earlier times, their neglect affects
comparisons with other countries and other
days. How much of an error may result is a
further question that deserves attention.
The problem of growth can hardly be
mentioned without bringing quickly to mind
questions relating to the volume and compo-
sition of capital, its mobility, investment and
savings, and the financial institutions and
markets that enable savers and investors to
meet most efficiently. We may expect that
governmentofficials,businessmen,labor
economists, and others in this country will be
as interested in the results of our studies of
these questions as the visitors to the National
Bureau who have come from other parts of
the earth to discuss our work.
Note has already been made of Kuznets'
volume, which is accompanied in this year's
list of publications by three other volumes in
the series of studies of trends in capital forma-
tion and financing, but a further word about
it is desirable.
People have become so familiar with terms
like"capitalformation,""grossnational
product," and "long-term trend," that they
often forget that the concepts referred to
should not be taken for granted. Kuznets, who
has struggled with these difficult ideas for
many years, and whose terminology has be-
come standard usage, is well aware of the
need to be clear about them. At the outset,
therefore, his book takes up the questions
involved and presents a thorough discussion
—reflecting unparalleled personal experience—
of the difficult concepts of capital formation
and related economic quantities, and of the
meaning of long-term trends. As I have said,
the substance of the work is an orderly presen-
tation and analysis of a vast body of quantita-
tive information on trends in the United States
since the 1870's. Information is provided not
only on the aggregates of national product
and capital formation and financing but also
on their composition and structure—for cx-ample, capital formation is classified by type
of asset, class of user, and industry. Further,
the trends in capital formation andfinancing
are studied in relation to corresponding trends
in output, population, and labor force,in
capital movements across the borders of the
United States, in security prices and yields,
and in the relative importance of financial
intermediaries.
Itis impossible to summarize the many
findings on the rate, character, and causes of
the economic growth of the United States, but
mention may be made of a few cardinal points
that have significant implications. First, over
the period since the 1870's, gross capital for-
mation has accounted for a fairly constant
proportion—somewhat over a flfth—of gross
national product. In other words, gross capital
formation grew at about the same rate as gross
national product—about 35 per cent per decade
on the average. Second, capital consumption—
mainly depreciation and obsolescence—rose
more rapidly than gross capital formation, so
that net capital formation—the difference be-
tween gross capital formation and capital
consumption—declined significantly in relation
to gross or net national product. In terms of
current prices, the decline was from around 13
per cent in the earlier years to somewhat less
than 9 per cent in recent years. Third, the
ratio of net capital stock to net national prod-
uct, both in constant prices, rose from the
1870's to the 1920's, and then declined. The
current "capital-output ratio" is lower than it
was eighty or ninety years ago.
The presentation of the findings is topped
off with a discussion of the problem and value
of projecting growth rates into the future that
no policy maker who indulges in this kind of
calculation willwantto miss. The tables with
which the text is studded are supplemented by
lengthy statistical appendixes which have al-
ready found many uses before publication and
may be expected to be used for years to come.
As Kuznets states in his concluding re-
marks, his inquiry "has no true beginning and
no sharp end. It has no beginning because it is
rooted in a variety of studies in the past. It has
no clear end because it is only in its absorption
in the next phase of the work in the field that
the study can make an effective contribution."
This is as true of the other National Bureau
studies dealing with growth—for example,
Kendrick's study of Productivity Trends in the
United States, also in press. Kendrick develops
a measure of productivity that compares output
with the input of capital as well as labor. It
could not have been done had it not been for
the work on capital already under way, as well
as for the earlier National Bureau work on
production, employment, and productivity.
Kendrick's book, like Kuznets', contains a
valuable body of data. In it is presented the
full evidence underlying two major findings
that have already attracted a great deal of at-
tention. One concerns the fact that increase in
the volume of labor and capital combined
accounts for but a portion of the increase in
national product over the decades. The rest of
the increase must be explained by technical
change, often embodied in quality improve-
ments of capital goods, by investment in edu-
cation, and by other factors, and some of our
studies are looking into these. The other finding
concerns an important shift in the trend of
productivity in the United States. Productivity
rose significantly more rapidly during the four
decades after World War I than during the
earlier decades. Whether this tilt in the trend
reflects an acceleration that can be assumed
to continue into the future is another difficult
question that can be answered, if at all, only
by further investigation.
The studies that I have mentioned so far
deal with basic scientific questions concerning
the rate, character, process, and causes of
growth. These are facts that must be deter-
mined if policy for growth is to rest on the solid
foundation of tested knowledge. A study that
we planned some time ago, and are now able
to undertake, will deal more directly with
policy. This is the study of tax policies for
economic growth to which Ture will turn his
hand shortly.
That tax rates influence the allocation of
capital to different regions seems to be illus-
trated by one factor in the problem of our
international balance of payments. This is the
11outflow of some capital from the United States
in response to savings made possible by the
so-called "tax havens," But tax rates affect also
the distribution of capital among different fields
of enterprise, and there is reason to suspect
that' they affect the aggregate of capital avail-
able for investment as well. However, it is not
known how strongly taxation influences in-
centives to invest and to do the other things
that determine the rate of economic growth. To
learn as much as we can of the relation between
taxation and economic growth is the objective
of the new study.
The fact that the study is more sharply
"policy-oriented" does not mean that its end
product will be policy proposals. Rather, its
purpose is to subject various policy proposals
to critical review, and to set forth objectively
the facts that must be weighed in choosing
among them.
Any review of so complex a problem, it is
clear, could not at any time or under any
auspices be conclusive in all respects. Yet a
serious effort, which could be widely accepted
as authoritative, would mark a major forward
step in public understanding of the tax system,
provide a better basis than we now have for
effective policy, and thus contribute to stimulat-
ing economic growth.
Before I leave the subject of growth, I should
refer to the very broad collection of National
Bureau statistics on the development of the
United States that became available during
the year in the new and massive volume of
Historical Statistics prepared by the Bureau of
the Census with the cooperation of the Social
Science Research Council. Most of the 8,000
seriesin the volume are from government
sources, but apart from the federal government
the National Bureau was by far the largest
contributor to the volume. Over 800 series, or
10 per cent, are taken wholly or in part from
National Bureau work, including data from
thirty different National Bureau books either
published or in press and from five unpublished
documents. Because many sections of His-
torical Statistics relate to areas outside the
Bureau's province, it is clear that much more
than 10 per cent of the economic series are
from the National Bureau, It may be men-
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tioned, also, that many other references to
Bureau data appear in the bibliographical
notes attached to the volume. The new His-
torical Statistics volume is a broad channel
through which our work will get to its users.
Another new study started late in 1960 deals
with the problems of the United States in a
changing world economy. I have already men-
tioned the concern felt over the United States
when the general public became aware of the
balance of payments deficit and learned some-
thing of its implications. The problem is es-
pecially interesting and important because it
involves more than the usual number of major
national objectives, short run and long run,
noneconomic as well as economic. These
objectivesare somewhat competitive. The
problem is also especially difficult, because it
involves developments abroad as well as in the
United States, and results from a mixture of
episodic and systematicfactors,including
among the latter cyclical, secular, and struct-
ural changes which must somehow be disen-
tangled. A great deal of attention is already
being paid to the problem in various quarters.
In many cases, however, the work must be
hurried and little more can be done than to
apply such knowledge as already exists. The
first job tackled by Lary, who joined us last fall
to take charge of our new study, is preparation
of a review of the major developments and of
a plan of research that, given the time and care
the problems deserve, may be expected to add
to knowledge as well as exploit it.
It is possible that before the results of some
of our studies begin to appear, a deficit in the
balance of payments may not be the immediate
problem that it is today. But whatever the cur-
rent situation a year or two or three hence, it
will be useful to know more than is now known
of the character and relative importance of the
episodic and systematic factors that influence
our exports and imports of commodities and
services and the ebb and flow of capital and
credit across our borders.
In reporting on the year's work and plans
of the National Bureau, I have singled out for
mention a few of the studies that bear on the
problem of inflation, the problem of business
fluctuations, the problem of economic growth,or the problem of international financial bal-
ance—all major problems of our day. Of
course, the problems are intertwined in more
than one way, as has been apparent; and it is
equally apparent that if the studies should shed
any light at all on our economy, they will not
fail to illuminate more than one problem.
The new study of interest rates, which we
are just getting under way, is broader than
most. It bears on capital and growth, in a
variety of ways, and also on questions of
stability, inflation, and international balance.
The study should provide information useful
in dealing with the problems that arise in de-
termining the effectiveness of monetary policy,
in choosing among alternative ways to manage
the federal debt, and in clarifying the contro-
versy that has already developed on policies
recently proposed to keep short-term interest
rates high for purposes of international balance
and push long-term rates down in order to
stimulate recovery and growth.
As Conard and Brown state in their report,
below, the study will build on earlier National
Bureau studies of bond prices and yields, of
cyclical fluctuations in the financial sphere, of
capital formation and financing, of the postwar
capital markets, and of the studies under way
of consumer finance, of risks and returns in
small business financing, and of credit quality.
Despite the advantages it derives from the
earlier work here and elsewhere, the new study
of interest rates will have some data gaps to fill.
Conard and Brown feel the need, for example,
for better information on mortgages, which
have bulked very large inthelong-term financ-
ing of the postwar period. Information is
required not only on interest rates when funds
are transferred, to point to one item, but also
on rates when commitments are made. The
dates often differ greatly. The investigators in
charge hope to give attention not only to
gathering and analyzing historical data but
also to developing a current reporting system
that will make future information more com-
plete and accurate and available more regu-
larly and promptly.
The major part of the new study will be
devoted, however, to analyzing the informa-
tion that is at hand or that can readily be ob-
tamed. Particular attention will be paid to the
behavior of interest rates and related yields in
relation to fluctuations in general business
conditions, and to the changes that seem to
have taken place in the relationship. For ex-
ample, the National Bureau's business cycle
studies demonstrate that bond yields have fre-
quently lagged at both peaks and troughs in
general business, but the length of lag has
varied from one cycle to another and in recent
years seems to have disappeared altogether.
In contrast, open-market short-term rates have
as a rule tended in earlier years as well as cur-
rently to turn rather promptly with general
business conditions, while the lag in the bank
rate charged customers has been consistent
enough for Moore to include it among his lag-
ging series. The nature, causes, and effects of
the variation in these and other interest rates
will be a subject of major concern in the new
study. So, too, will the changing relations
among different rates and yields that are indi-
cated by the preceding remarks. An intensive
study will be made, for the recent period when
the information is more readily available, of
such rates classified by risk, term to maturity,
age of issue, type of asset, and in other ways.
As our plan for the study provides, the work
mentioned is to be done in so far as it is feasible
and contributes to the major objective, which
is to explore the causes, consequences, and
implications for the future of the recent and
longer-term developments in interest rates and
related financial factors.
As is appropriate, I have been focusing at-
tention very largely on this year's studies and
plans. Yet here, as in the more detailed state-
ments in Parts II and III, what we have to say
about our current work also says much about
the work of earlier years. For the National
Bureau is a continuing enterprise. Each year's
report constitutes an observation, at the time,
on the enterprise as a whole. By this I do not
mean merely that virtually all studies com-
pleted this year were begun in earlier years, or
that the bulk of this year's work is on studies
included in last year's and still earlier lists.
More important, what we were able to do
during the past year reflects the results and the
13experience of all the work carried on since the
very inception of the National Bureau.
The studies of each year support and
strengthen one another. Note has been made
of current business cycle studies that contribute
to the work on economic indicators, and of
research on which the new interest rate study
will build. Both lists could be expanded. And
when pointing to the other studies, also, refer-
ence could have been made to supporting work
at the National Bureau. For example, the
investigation of export and import prices, the
study of net worth changes in relation to price
changes, and the newly published studies of
long-term trends in wages and the cost of living
deal with price change. Useful information for
the new tax policies study already exists,
among other places, in the several sections of
the personal tax study that have gotten into
print, including the book on personal deduc-
tions in this year's list, and the studies on the
way to press, which deal with exemptions,
dividends, and entrepreneurial income. And
the current studies of the structure of world
trade and payments and of trends and cycles
in United States imports and exports, the
recently published work on international finan-
cial relations and business cycles, and the new
work on interest rates and taxation should be
helpful in the research we are planning on the
problems of the United States in a changing
world economy.
Further, as some of these examples indi-
cate, the studies of each year also build on the
National Bureau's work of past years. Our
results cumulate.
Of course, the National Bureau does not
work in isolation. We make an effort to profit
from the past and current work of others en-
gaged in economic research, and we know that
our past and current work finds its uses in
theirs. The regular conferences that we help to
organize through theUniversities-National
Bureau Committee for Economic Research
and the Conference on Research in Income
and Wealth have as their purpose the exchange
of ideas and the stimulation of research. This
is the purpose also of the conferences in which
we cooperate on occasion with others—the
Social Science Research Council a year or two
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ago, and the Merrill Center for Economics this
coming June—and the conferences we set up
entirely on our own. We count the time,
energy, and funds we give to the conferences
and to the preparation and publication of their
proceedings a profitable investment that yields
returns to all scholars.
As I have said, most of the work brought
to completion this year was begun many
months ago. This fact is not one in which we
take pride. Our objective is useful knowle4ge.
Time is one of the costs we have to incur to
reach it. It takes time to meet scientific stand-
ards.[f we had larger resources which we
could spend freely, we might be able to reduce
the time. It could be worth doing this even if
the reduction in time were not proportionate
to the increased rate of expenditure, as would
very likely be the case. But there is a limit on
the time that can be saved if good work is to
be done. Especially in the basic research on
which we concentrate, there is often much that
might be lost by hurry.
In one sense, this means that basic economic
research must always lag behind the problems
in which it finds its uses. It is better, however,
to regard this in another way: it means that
we must plan ahead. We must deal with the
persistent problems and avoid the ephemeral.
Since no one can foresee the exact shape that
tomorrow's problems will take, we must focus
on fundamental questions, the answers to
which will find their uses in many different
ways.
Solid research takes time. It takes money.
But it takes still more, and it is well to remind
ourselves and our supporters of this. Basic
research is an uncertain enterprise. Nobody
can be sure how his questions and his hypo-
theses will change in form and content as they
come under close scrutiny and facts bearing
on them are accumulated. Simple questions
turn out to be complicated as often as compli-
cated questions prove to be simple. Important
questions are sometimes found to be trivial,
but seemingly minor questions sometimes be-
come serious stumbling blocks to the solutions
sought. "More funds for basic research are
indeed required," said Warren Weaver a few
years ago. "But of even greater importanceis the way in which basic research funds are
made available—the flexibility, the stability,
the freedom from intellectually dishonest com-
mitment, with which competent scholarship
should be supported."2 His wise remark ap-
plies not less to basic research in economics
than to basic research in the other sciences.
Indeed, it applies with even greater force to
economics, in which all problems seem urgent
and everyone has his opinions on how to go
about solving them.
I return to the importance of economic
policy and of the research devoted to putting it
on a firmer foundation.
The rate and character of economic progress
2DadWolfe (ed.). Symposiumon Basic Research,
American Associationforthe Advancement of
Science, Publication No. 56, Washington, 1959, p. xiv.
are surely influenced by economic policy. Can
there still be a question whether it matters how
money and government debt are managed?
So, too, taxes matter. The level and direction
and flexibility of government spending matter.
The state of competition matters. It matters
how the international accounts are balanced.
Our economic progress, and in the end the
economic progress of others—and much more
than the economic progress—depend on how
well the economic policy of the United States
is formulated and how effectively it is carried
out. In turn, this depends in some part on
knowledge of how the economy operates.
Economic research can contribute to economic
progress.
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